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SECTION 1983
Judge Leon Lazer:
I would like to introduce you to the moderator of the first
two sections of this program dealing with section 1983 and
dealing as well with the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment
cases that relate to local government law. Judge George Pratt
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is
certainly one of the outstanding judges in the American judicial system today. We are proud that he is a Long Islander and
even more proud that he was a municipal lawyer. He has
served as Village Attorney of Westbury, Roslyn Harbor, and
Brookville as well as Special Counsel to the Board of Supervisors of Nassau County in the towns of Hempstead, North
Hempstead and Babylon. He is a graduate of Yale Law
School, and he was Law Clerk to Judge Froessel of the New
York State Court of Appeals.
Judge George Pratt:
My function as moderator is most moderate. The first segment is labeled "Section 1983,"' and it is something of a misnomer. The whole program could be called "Section 1983"
with a minor exception of some of the criminal aspects because
most of the litigation that we are talking about throughout the
day are cases that are brought up under that strange section of
Title 42 of the United States Code. In this segment, we are
focusing upon essentially those cases that do not fall into the
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
Id.
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other segments loosely called "Civil Rights," however they are
labeled or categorized, but which are nonetheless an extremely
important part of litigation, not only in the Supreme Court,
but also certainly in the lower federal courts, which includes
my own.
Last Term, roughly, depending on how you categorize them,
there were thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen opinions out of the Supreme Court that fall into this general area.2 They present a
smorgasbord of issues. It is almost as if the Supreme Court, in
granting their certioraries, lined up the various key issues
under section 1983 litigation and said, all right, we will have
one from column "A," one from column "B," "C," right down
through "J." It presents a wide range of matters for discussion.
Due to the limitations of time this morning, obviously all of
them cannot be discussed. Our two speakers in this area will do
their best to focus on the important ones.
Last year, when I was introducing this part of the program,
I passed out a word of advice, and I cannot do anything to
improve on it, but read it to you.
One cannot help but wonder where the Supreme Court is going. Do
we have a Reagan-appointed Court that is hell-bent on turning back
the clock on civil rights or is that too simplistic a view of what is
happening? As we work through the cases today, I ask you to think
not only of what the Supreme Court did in these cases, but think also
3
of what they could have done but did not do.

Apply that same kind of analysis to what we have here.
Taking a very simplistic view of last Term, out of the dozen
or so cases, as I look at them, the plaintiff was successful in
eight,4 the defendant was successful in one,5 and in the remain2. See, e.g., Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, I10 S. Ct. 2510 (1990); Howlett v.
Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990); Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 110 S. Ct. 1737 (1990);
Venegas v. Mitchell, 110 S. Ct. 1679 (1990); Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975
(1990).
3. Pratt, Section 1983, The Supreme Court and Local Government Law, 6
ToURo L. REv. 5, 6 (1989).
4. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill.,
110 S.Ct. 2729 (1990) (use of political
patronage considerations in hiring, transfer and other empoyment decisions violated
plaintiffs first amendment rights); Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S.Ct. 2510,
2518-19 (1990) ("Boren Amendment imposes a binding obligation on States participating in the Medicaid program to adopt reasonable and adequate rates and that
this obligation is enforceable under section 1983"); Howlett v. Rose, I10 S. Ct.
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ing three or four, possibly five, it is hard to tell who really won
the case.6 Sometimes when the plaintiff wins, that only may
mean that the individual plaintiff wins and all future plaintiffs
are dead, but the simplistic view is about two to one in favor of
the plaintiffs in the overall score here.
In this big smorgasbord of issues, there are two that I think
stand out - two cases that are extremely important. One is
Zinermon v. Burch,7 where the Court seemed like it was going
to come to grips with many of the issues raised by the enigmatic decision of Parrattv. Taylor,8 and Leon Friedman is going to discuss that in some detail with you. The other decision
2430, 2442 (1990) ("Florida court's refusal to entertain one discreet category of
section 1983 claims, when the court entertains similar state court actions against
state defendants, violates the Supremecy Clause"); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.
v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990) (bi-state compact's venue provision deemed to
constitute waiver of eleventh amendment immunity from suit); Venegas v. Mitchell,
110 S. Ct. 1679 (1990) (contingent-fee contracts requiring prevailing plaintiffs to
pay more than the statutory award amount are valid); Lytle v. Household Mfg., 110
S. Ct. 1331 (1990) (Court refused to apply collateral estoppel to bar plaintiff's right
to jury trial where district court erroneously dismissed plaintiff's legal claim);
Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990) (plaintiff's complaint, alleging confinement in mental hospital without valid consent or involuntary confinement hearing,
stated a section 1983 cause of action since liberty deprivations of this type were
foreseeable); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444
(1989) (defendant city violated plaintiff's right to use economic tactics in collective
bargaining process by refusing to renew plaintiff's franchise agreement, and was
therefore liable for damages under section 1983).
5. Ngiraningas v. Sanchez, 110 S. Ct. 1737 (1990) (plaintiffs' claims against territory of Guam and its officials dismissed in that they are not "persons" within the
meaning of section 1983).
6. See Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990) (Court reached neither
petitioners' claims that the order imposing contempt sanctions upon them violated
their first amendment right to freedom of speech, nor the claim that they were absolutely immune for their legislative actions, but did reverse the order, holding that
the district court should have implemented contempt fines against the city alone,
before resorting to fining individual legislators); Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct.
1651 (1990) (Court found that the district court had abused its discretion in imposing a direct property tax increase to fund a desegregation remedy, but upheld an
order of the court of appeals which required the local legislators to implement this
tax increase themselves); Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 110 S. Ct. 1249 (1990)
(Court found that plaintiff's dormant commerce clause claim had been rendered
moot, but remanded to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to section 1988
attorneys' fees as a "prevailing party" at the district court level).
7. 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).
8. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
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which should be of particular interest to town attorneys, village
attorneys, and so forth, is Missouri v. Jenkins,9 where the Supreme Court held that a district judge should not directly levy
a tax on the residents of a municipality, 10 but that it can order
the municipality to levy a tax for purposes of implementing a
2
desegregation remedy." That, combined with the Yonkers
case, to be discussed by Professor Schwartz, which emphasize
the power of the remedies that are available to a district court
that, in my view, border on the revolutionary. Trained as a municipal lawyer to think that a court can tell a municipal legislator how he must vote on pain of contempt, or ordering him to
directly levy taxes which may be in excess of state constitutional limits, is revolutionary. The Court docketed a number of
these issues, but nevertheless sustained the underlying validity
of the remedy.
At the risk of sounding like a commercial for next year's
program, the real interest in this area of litigation is to be
found beginning the second Monday in October. Judge Souter's committee is supposed to vote on his appointment. It
seems rather clear that he is going to be confirmed,' 3 although
you never know what is going to happen. The significant factor
is that Brennan is no longer on the Court. 4 Justice Brennan
has written many of the key decisions over the last twenty
years in this area. He has always been identified with the liberal group in the Court, and most of the key decisions that he
has written have been five-to-four decisions."
9. 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
10. Id. at 1663.

11. Id. at 1665 ("[A] court order directing a local government body to levy its
own taxes is plainly a judicial act within the power of the Federal court"); see Infra
note 86-95 and accompanying text.
12. Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990); see infra notes 78-85 and

accompanying text.
13. David H. Souter was confirmed as the 105th Justice of the United States
Supreme Court on October 2, 1990. The Senate affirmed President George Bush's
nomination of Justice Souter by a 90-9 vote. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1990, at Al, col.

4.
14. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., a member of the Court for 34 years, resigned
as an Associate Justice on July 20, 1990. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
15. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2518-19 (1990) (viola-

tion of Boren Amendment is actionable under section 1983); Smith v. Wade, 461
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In my Civil Rights Seminar that I am now teaching here at
Touro, I have two students who are working on a project to
analyze all of the decisions of the last ten years in the section
1983 area, where Justice Brennan was in the majority and it
was a five to four vote. They are going to figure out what is
going to happen if you replace somebody of a liberal bent with
somebody of a conservative bent and what reasonably might be
done to restructure the picture, the framework, the effect on
section 1983 litigation. It is a fascinating study. Compound
that with the Civil Rights Act of 199016 which is still kicking
around in Congress, but which has gone farther than any bill
has in the last fifteen years, and we may find that the picture
next year at this time, when we address it, is going to be much
different than what it looks like today.
The formal presentations, as I have indicated, will be by
Professors Schwartz and Friedman. They are both distinguished teachers, authors and lecturers on the subject of constitutional litigation in general, and section 1983 in particular.
Professor Martin A. Schwartz will speak to you first. He is a
professor here at Touro Law School. He has been engaged in
this field for some twenty years. He is the co-author of what, in
my opinion, is the best book in the field, which is entitled, very
simply, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses and Fees."'

He writes a column in the New York Law Journal entitled
"Public Interest Law," which usually discusses cases that are
brought up under section 1983. Professor Schwartz will discuss
the larger number of cases in this smorgasbord, leaving for
Professor Friedman primarily his target of Zinermon v.
Burch.'
U.S. 30, 56 (1983) ("[A] jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an

action under section 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by
evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others"); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638
(1980) (municipality may not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a
defense to liability under section 1983).
16. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. 9944-46 (1990).

17. M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN. SECTION
AND FEES (1986 & Supp. 1990).
18. 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).

1983
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Professor Martin Schwartz:

Over the past several terms, the Supreme Court has been
very actively involved in shaping the contours of the law of section 198319 and section 198820 attorneys' fees. 2' It seems noteworthy that in an era, particularly the last two or three terms
of the Court, in which the Court has been widely criticized for
cutting back on civil rights,22 especially in employment discrimination cases under Title VI123 and section 1981,24 that the
Court has continued to give a generally pro-plaintiff interpretation to section 1983.25 For the most part, the Court's work last
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
21. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990); Howlett v. Rose,
110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990); Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 110 S. Ct. 1737 (1990); Venegas v.
Mitchell, 110 S. Ct. 1679 (1990); Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990);
Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of
Los Angeles, 110 S. Ct. 444 (1989); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S.
Ct. 2304 (1989); Hardin v. Straub, 109 S. Ct. 1998 (1989); Texas State Teachers
Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989); Blanchard v. Bergeron,
489 U.S. 87 (1989); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488
U.S. 1 (1988); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Deakins v.
Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193 (1988).
22. See 136 CONG. REc. S968 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Gore);
136 CONG. REc. S1018-19 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy);
136 CONG. REC. S1021-22 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Jeffords); 136
CONG. REc. S1022-23 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum);
136 CONG. REC. S1023 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatfield); 136
CONG. REC. S1023-24 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Simon); 136
CONG. REc. S1024-25 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Packwood); 136
CONG. REC. S1025 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988); see, e.g., Belton, Causation and Burden-shifting
Doctrines in Employment DiscriminationLaw Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1359, 1364, 1405 (1990); Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1407, 1407 (1990);
Getman, The Changing Role of Courts and the PotentialRole of Unions in Overcoming Employment Discrimination,64 TUL. L. REV. 1477, 1478 (1990); Greene,
Race in the Twenty-First Century: Equality Through Law?, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1515,
1515 (1990).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct.
2702 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
25. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990); Howlett v. Rose,
110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990); Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990); Zinermon v.
Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,
110 S. Ct. 444 (1989); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
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Term involved not the breaking of new ground but rather the
refining of areas that the Court had been previously involved
in.26
Let me start by giving you an example: In 1989, the Court
decided a case called Will v. Michigan Department of State
Police.27 In the Will case, the Supreme Court ruled that states
and state agencies are not "persons" within the meaning of
section 198328 that can be sued for monetary relief.29 Now, last
Term the Court had a case before it called Ngiraingas v.
Sanchez30 in which it was asked to decide whether the territory
of Guam was a "person" within the meaning of section 1983.31
At the Practicing Law Institute's annual program on section
1983 litigation, which was held last year before the Ngiraingas
decision came down from the Supreme Court, an attorney who
attended that program informed us that in his view it was a
very easy issue. What he said was that if no man is an island,
it must follow that no island is a person. Indeed the United
32
States Supreme Court in Ngiraingas agreed with this result,
although it did not agree with the reasoning of the Practicing
Law Institute participant. 3 The Court, in Ngiraingas, held
that, like states, a territory such as the territory of Guam is not
a person subject to suit under section 1983.)
Now, you might be saying to yourself "who cares" and I
think that would be a legitimate question because I assume
that most of you are New York practitioners and that you do
not have a very heavy caseload of Guam cases. The decision,
however, does raise a question, and that is; does the holding in
Ngiraingas preclude the present ongoing constitutional challenge to Guam's abortion law which has been highly publicized
26. Compare Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990) with Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527 (1981).
27. 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).

28. Id. at 2312.
29. See id.
30. 110 S. Ct. 1737 (1990).
31. Id. at 1738.

32. Id. at 1743.
33. Id. at 1742. (Court based its decision on statutory construction and congressional intent).
34. Id. at 1743.
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by the media? The answer is, it does not for these reasons: the
only thing precluded by the decision in Ngiraingas is a claim
for monetary relief against Guam itself.36 What is not precluded is prospective relief against an official of Guam in an
official's capacity,36 nor is monetary relief against the Guam
official in an individual capacity precluded.31 Thus, the decision
in Ngiraingaswill not preclude the present constitutional challenge to the Guam abortion statute from going forward.
I believe that the Court's other section 1983 decisions that
were rendered last Term are likely to have a more pertinent
impact on New York practitioners and, as Judge Pratt said,
they do represent a rather wide range of decisions. I have
grouped them into the following categories and I am going to
go through the categories one by one.
First, the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor;38 second, the question of enforcement of federal statutes under section 1983;
third, state court section 1983 actions and specifically the application of state law sovereign immunity to a section 1983
claim brought in state court; fourth, the question of the remedies that a federal court may award in a section 1983 action;
and, finally, the issue I am sure is near and dear to the heart of
all section 1983 practitioners, statutory attorneys' fees.
To turn to the first question, in my opinion, the most important section 1983 decision that was rendered by the United
States Supreme Court last Term was its decision in Zinermon
v. Burch3 9 which fleshed out or, I should say, attempted to
flesh out, the contours of the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor.40
Viewed broadly, what the Parratt v. Taylor doctrine brings
into play is the relationship between state law remedies and the
federal section 1983 remedy.41
35. Plaintiffs sought monetary damages only. Id. at 1738.

36. See id.
37. See id.
38. 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (Plaintiff's deprivation did not occur as the result of
some established state procedure, but rather as a result of the unauthorized failure
of state agents to follow established state procedure).
39. 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).

40. Id. at 985-87.
41. Parratt,451 U.S. 527 (1981) (plaintiff did not suffer a violation of a constitutional right even though he was deprived of his property under the color of state
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In Zinermon, the Court did have an opportunity to revamp
entirely the law of section 1983 and it seems to me highly significant that given this opportunity, the Court chose not to do
so. I think the Zinermon case is significant for three reasons
that are related to each other.
First of all, what Zinermon does is to reaffirm the uniquely
independent nature of the federal section 1983 remedy.' 2
When I say that, I mean that by recognizing the independent
nature of the section 1983 remedy, the Court has rendered
available state law remedies generally irrelevant to the propriety of a section 1983 claim to a relief.43 The Court also reaffirmed the fact that state remedies are generally irrelevant on
the question of whether the section 1983 plaintiff has suffered
a deprivation of federal constitutionally protected rights."
Third, and related to the first two, the Court has made clear
that the available state judicial remedies are only pertinent in
a rather narrow class of procedural due process claims that are
litigated under section 1983.'5
Now, to understand the whole Parratt v. Taylor doctrine,
and the decision in Zinermon and why it is so important, requires a great deal of detail about both Parrattitself and the
follow-up decisions, and the decision in Zinermon. I am leaving
all of that to Professor Leon Friedman. He is truly an expert
not only on section 1983 generally, but also particularly on this
question of Parrattv. Taylor. I know that he is going to give
both the Parratt doctrine and the particular decision in
Zinermon the full in-depth analysis that they deserve.
I will now move to the second area, the enforcement of federal statutory rights under section 1983. Section 1983 authorizes not only the enforcement of federal constitutionally prolaw because the loss of property was due to the negligence of a state official and not

because of established procedures; these procedures were not challenged, it was not
possible to give plaintiff a pre-deprivation hearing and the state provided a postdeprivation remedy in tort). Id. at 543; see infra note 123-40 and accompanying
text.
42. See Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 982-83 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
176 (1961)).
43. Id. at 982.

44. Id. at 983.
45. Id.
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tected rights, 46 but also authorizes the enforcement of federal
statutory rights.47 The process in the United States Supreme
Court from the standpoint of Supreme Court decisionmaking
has been one of starts and stops and perhaps restarts. 48 A logical starting point is the Court's 1980 decision in Maine v.
Thiboutot,49 where the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, held that any federal statute may be enforced
under section 1983 against a state or local official. 50 The decision provoked an angry dissent from the normally mild-mannered Justice Lewis Powell. Justice Powell annexed to that dissenting opinion what he labeled a sampling of a rather large
number of federal statutes which he said were now enforceable
against state and local government as a result of the decision
reached by the majority. 51 At the time that Thiboutot was decided, the public interest bar was duly grateful to Justice Powell for sharing his research with them. As it turned out, they
should not have been so appreciative because the dissenting
opinion by Justice Powell later proved to be influential to the
point where in subsequent decisions the Court created two exceptions to the rule of Maine v. Thiboutot. 2 That is to say, it
recognized that there are two types of federal statutes which,
in fact, are not enforceable under section 1983.
The first is the situation where the federal statute is found
by the Court to not be the source of a federally protected right,
but only represents a declaration of congressional policy.5 3
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see supra note 1.

47. Id.
48. The Court cut back in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), in Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), and
in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28-9 (1981). How-

ever, the last three Supreme Court decisions to deal with this issue have upheld the
enforcement of federal statutes under section 1983. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.

Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,
110 S. Ct. 444 (1989); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S.

418 (1987).
49. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).

50. Id. at 4-5.
51. Id. at 34-37 (Powell, J., dissenting).

52. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012-13 (1984); Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1981).
53. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28-29.
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There are times, the Supreme Court says, when the Congress
seeks not to hit state and local government over the head by
imposing binding obligations, but rather seeks only to nudge nudge is the word of the Court - nudge state and local government in Congress's preferred direction."
The second situation is where the federal statute has created
its own enforcement remedies. The Court finds that Congress
intended to have the exclusive enforcement remedies, thereby
precluding resort to section 1983. 51 The whole area depends
upon congressional intent. 58 I say that somewhat tongue in
cheek because often in this area, as in other areas with congressional intent, the congressional intent is unclear. In fact,
sometimes it is non-existent, requiring federal courts to make
guesses about what Congress intended about an issue that Congress perhaps did not even think about at all. The issue is further complicated by the fact that here we are really dealing
with two federal statutes and their inter-relationship with one
another, the federal statute that is at issue and its relationship
to section 1983.11
Last Term, in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles,58 the Court held that the National Labor Relations
Act 59 created a federal statutory right enforceable under section 1983 requiring the collective bargaining process be free of
state interference. 6' The second case that the Court dealt with
in this area last Term, a more highly publicized decision, is a
case called Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association.8 ' The
Court held that health care providers could bring suit under
section 1983 to enforce their right to the reasonable reimburse54. Id. at 19; See also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413 (1970).
55. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1013 (1984).
56. Id. at 1012.
57. See, e.g., id.; see also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1981); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 27-31 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
58. 110 S. Ct. 444 (1989).
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
60. Golden State, 110 S. Ct. at 450.
61. 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990).
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ment rates that the Court found were guaranteed by the Boren
Amendment to the Federal Medicaid Act. 2
In my opinion, these decisions have significance beyond the
specific holdings. I think that they reflect a philosophy that the
enforcement of federal statutes against state and local officials
under section 1983 is the norm and that nonenforcement, pursuant to the two exceptions that the Court has delineated, is to
be reserved for somewhat exceptional or special circumstances.
Now, I would like to address the third area, state court section 1983 actions. There has been a substantial increase in the
number and types of section 1983 claims that have been litigated in the state courts over the past decade.6 3 During the
same period, the United States Supreme Court has become increasingly involved with the entire subject of state court section 1983 claims.6 ' In 1980, the Court held that a section 1983
claim may be brought in the state courts.6 5 Since that ruling in
1980, the Court has been attempting to determine the extent to
which state law may be applied in state court section 1983 actions.6 6 The dominant theme of this series of United States Supreme Court decisions is that a section 1983 claim that is litigated in a state court should be litigated pursuant to the same
fundamental rules that would govern the litigation of a section
67
1983 claim in a federal court.
To give three examples: The Court has held that, just as
state notice of claim rules are inapplicable in federal court section 1983 actions, so too are they inapplicable in state court
section 1983 actions.68 Just as, to give a second example, retrospective monetary relief may not be awarded by a federal court
against state government because of the application of the eleventh amendment,6 9 so too, in a state court section 1983 action,
62. Id. at 2517, see supra note 4.
63. S. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 1 (1990).

64. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990); Will v. Michigan Dep't of
State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988); Maine
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
65. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
66. See, e.g., Howlett, 110 S. Ct. 2430; Felder, 487 U.S. 131.
67. See supra note 64.
68. Felder, 487 U.S. at 141.
69. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974).
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retrospective monetary relief may not be awarded against state
government. The latter is not because of the eleventh amendment which is inapplicable in state court, but rather because of
the Supreme Court's definition of "person" under section 1983
as not including states and their agencies.
The third example is that the Court has made clear that the
attorneys' fee statute,71 section 1988, which pertains to section
1983 claims, is equally applicable in federal and state court
section 1983 actions. 2
Last Term's decision in Howlett v. Rose" continues this
theme of parity of treatment of section 1983 claims in state
and federal court.74 Since municipal entities are subject to liability in federal court section 1983 actions, Howlett holds that
they are also subject to liability in state court section 1983 actions.751 This means that state sovereign immunity law may not
be applied so as to immunize a municipal entity from section
1983 liability in a state court action. The Court, in Howlett,
relied upon the fact that the elements. of the section 1983 claim
for relief and defenses are matters of federal law." 6 Under the
supremacy clause, state rules, including state defenses like
state law sovereign immunity, that are inconsistent with or in
some basic way clash with the elements or defenses of the federal section 1983 claim, must give way to the overriding or
dominant section 1983 interest. 7
I am turning now to the fourth area, which is the question of
remedies in section 1983 actions. The Court rendered two decisions in highly publicized cases last Term.78 The decisions
broadly deal with the remedial powers of the federal courts to
rectify systemic constitutional violations, specifically in in70. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
72. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980).
73. 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990).
74. See id. at 2442-43.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2442.
77. Id. at 2438, 2443 (citing Owen v. City of Independence. 445 U.S. 622, 647,
n.30 (1980) and Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980)).
78. Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990); Spallone v. United States, I10
S. Ct. 625 (1990).
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stances in which public officials have failed to comply with a
mandate of the federal court. In one, the Yonkers housing discrimination suit, Spallone v. United States,9 the specific issue
was whether it was proper for the federal district court to impose sanctions, monetary fines on the members of the Yonkers
City Council, where they had refused to adopt legislation authorizing housing construction that had been mandated by a
consent decree entered into by the City of Yonkers.80
There were two .major issues presented to the Supreme
Court in the Spallone case. The first was whether a legislative
official's vote on local legislation constituted protected speech
within the meaning of the first amendment. 8 The second question before the Court was whether absolute legislative immunity that protects state legislative officials from any type of
federal court relief should also be extended to protect local legislative officials. s2 This is an issue which, oddly enough, the
United States Supreme Court has never resolved. Well, neither
of these issues were reached by the Supreme Court in the
Spallone case. 3 Instead, the Court rendered what I view as
being a rather narrow decision, holding that, under the particular circumstances of the case, the district court abused its discretion in imposing -civil contempt sanctions on the council
members without first attempting to bring about compliance by
the city by imposing sanctions against the city itself.84 The
Court in Spallone was concerned that sanctions against the local council members could improperly interfere with the local
legislative process by perhaps prompting those legislative officials to act in their own self-interest with their personal liability at the forefront, rather than the interest of the city, and the
interest of their constituents, being a primary concern.85
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

110 S. Ct. 625 (1990).

Id. at 628.
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 634.
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In the Missouri school desegregation case,88 which Judge
Pratt described to you, the Court discussed an order to finance
a school desegregation remedy, whereby the particular remedy
was the imposition of a magnet school," and I might say that
it was a rather elaborate magnet school. 8 However, the concurrence went to some lengths to ridicule the magnet school's 89
agricultural farm, the fact that each room was to be air conditioned and so forth.90 Well, the Court held that in order to
finance the school desegregation remedy, federal courts do
have the power to order local officials to increase property
taxes even if the increase in property taxes is violative of state
law. 91 The vote in the case was five to four. 92 The concurrence
was in agreement with the majority that the district court
could not itself increase the taxes. 3 However, the majority
took the position that the district court did have the power to
order local officials to increase taxes to a point, to an extent,
86. Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990). Justice White delivered the

opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined.
87. Id. at 1657 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 34-35 (W.D. Mo.
1985)). Magnet schools are public schools of voluntary enrollment designed to promote integration by drawing students away from their neighborhoods and private
schools through distinctive curricula and high quality programs. Id. at 1657 n.6.
88. Id. at 1657 n.7. The district court authorized $12,972,727 for operation of
the six magnet schools and $12,877,330 for further capital improvements at those
schools. Id.
89. Id. at 1676-77 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor and Scalia, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The concurrence noted that "[t]his
Court has never approved a remedy of the type adopted by the District Court.
There are strong arguments against the validity of such a plan." Id. at 1676. The
Court stated that "[plerhaps it is a good educational policy to provide a school
district with the items included in the KCMSD capital improvement plan, for example: high schools in which every classroom will have air conditioning, an alarm system, and 15 microcomputers; a 2,000-square-foot planetarium; greenhouses and vivariums. . .

."

Id. "But these items are part of legitimate political debate over

educational policy and spending priorities, not the Constitution's command of racial
equality." Id. at 1677.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1666.
92. See infra note 104.
93. 110 S. Ct. at 1667 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor and Scalia, JJ.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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necessary to finance this school desegregation remedy."4 The
concurring Justices saw no meaningful distinction between the
district court itself increasing the taxes, on the one hand, and
the district court ordering local officials to increase taxes, on
the other. 5
In my view, the majority has the better argument. It seems
elementary to me that for school desegregation remedies to be
meaningful they must be complied with, they must be enforced
and enforcement means one thing clearly. It means coming up
with the funds to finance the remedy. If the responsible government officials do not on their own come up with the funds to
finance the remedy, it seems to me that the district court must
be in a position, must have the power, to compel those officials
to do so. I think that compelling officials to raise revenues is
not quite the same thing as a district court imposing the tax
increase itself because when a district court compels officials to
raise revenue, those officials are still left with the leeway, the
discretionary power, to determine how to structure the tax
increase.
The last area to discuss is the question of attorneys' fees. In
1989, with Blanchard v. Bergeron,9 the Court held that attorneys' fees which are recovered by plaintiffs' counsel under a
contingent fee agreement are not the maximum fees that a
court may award to plaintiffs' counsel under the federal civil
rights attorneys' fees statute, 7 that is, section 1988.98 Last
Term, the Court, in Venegas v. Mitchel9 dealt with the opposite issue; namely whether the fees that are awarded to the
plaintiff under the fee statute, section 1988, are the maximum
fees that plaintiffs' counsel may receive pursuant to a contingent fee agreement. 100
94. Id. at 1666.
95. Id. at 1669-70 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor and Scalia, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
96. 489 U.S. 87 (1989).
97. Id. at 96.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
99. 110 S. Ct. 1679 (1990).
100. Id. at 1680-81.
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Again, the Court answered that question in the negative."0 1
If you put the two cases together, it means that the contingent
fee is not viewed as establishing the outer limit of the federal
statutory section 1988 fee award, 0 2 and, by the same token,
the section 1988 fee award is not viewed as establishing the
outer limit of the contingency recovery. 0 3 Whether or not one
agrees with the results in these two cases, its hard not to marvel at this rare display of legal symmetry.
Judge George Pratt:
I was just doing some analysis of the cases that are included
in the materials as to the position of Justice Brennan. I see
that Missouri v. Jenkins,0 4 the ordering of taxation case, Wilder,10 5 the more important one of the statutory interpretation
cases, and Zinermon,0 0 are all five to four decisions with Justice Brennan in the majority. This raises questions as to what
happens next. For our purposes, what happens next is a deeper
look at Zinerrnon and Parrattv. Taylor. 07
Professor Leon Friedman is, as you probably know, outstanding in this field. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School.
He teaches at Hofstra Law School; he writes, and perhaps,
most importantly, he actively litigates in the field, so he is not
one of those ivory tower-type professors who really does not
know what is going on out there. Perhaps of more significance
to me than to the rest of you, he is also one of those few people
around the country outside of the judiciary who is called upon
101. Id. at 1684. The Court stated that:
[Section] 1988 controls what the losing defendant must pay, not what the
prevailing plaintiff must pay his lawyer. What a plaintiff may be bound to
pay and what an attorney is free to collect under a fee agreement are not
necessarily measured by the 'reasonable attorney's fee' that a defendant must
pay pursuant to a court order. Section 1988 itself does not interfere with the
enforceability of a contingent-fee contract.
Id.
102. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989).
103. Venegas, 110 S. Ct. at 1684.
104. 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
105. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990).

106. Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).
107. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

by the Federal Judicial Center to teach judges about problems
in this area of law.
Professor Leon Friedman:

Since several people have promised you that I would speak
on Parrattv. Taylor, I guess I had better do so at this point.
The issue is really an older one, regarding the parallel scheme
of state and federal enforcement of individual rights. Thirty
years ago, in 1960, when some of you were practicing - if a
policeman beat you up; or a school board fired you; or a city
deprived you of a building permit - you would not go into
federal court. You would go into state court, sue for trespass,
false imprisonment, assault, or breach of contract. Or you
would go into state court under Article 78,108 because you did
not get your permit. You would state that the local licensing
agent acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by refusing
you a permit. You can still go into state court pursuant to an
Article 78 proceeding. Nothing in the development of section
1983109 law precludes an individual from seeking traditional
common law and statutory remedies that are available under
state law when government does something to you that is not
to your liking.
What the Supreme Court did in Monroe v. Pape"0 was to
say that the availability of these state remedies does not preclude federal constitutional remedy at the same time.' The
famous debate at that time, which Justice Frankfurter stated
in his long dissent,"' centered on whether the act that you
were complaining of was required by state law, not simply authorized by state law. If that act was in effect compelled by
state law, according to Justice Frankfurter, then you could go
into federal court on section 1983.113 But if the act that you
108. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. art. 78 (McKinney 1981).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see supra note 1.

110. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe, the petitioners claimed that the invasion
of their home, the subsequent illegal search, as well as Mr. Monroe's arrest and
detention without a warrant constituted a deprivation of their rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution. Id. at 170.
111. Id. at 183.
112. Id. at 202 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 246.
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are complaining of was somehow against state law, then you
11 4
should go into state court and get your remedy there.
In 1961, in Monroe v. Pape,115 the Supreme Court said no,
that is not the law. If you could parse a federal constitutional
claim, then you may come into federal court right away. It was
not an exhaustion issue; it was not a preclusion issue, but
rather that the federal courts were open for your remedy.2 °
It was Monroe v. Pape, and the last point that Professor
Schwartz talked about, 1976 Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee
Award Act and the Counsel Fees Cases,"1 7 that really carried
the ball and has been the reason for this explosion in section
1983 case law. If you go into state court and win your assault
and battery case against a policeman, you are not going to get
your counsel fees. You can also go into state court with a section 1983 claim as well, but for a variety of reasons it still is
assumed that the federal forum is the preferable one. If you go
into federal court, and turn it into a constitutional case, you
will get your counsel fees.
It was Monroe v. Pape and the Counsel Fees Law of 1976118
that really created the explosion of litigation. For those of you
in local government, much litigation that was formerly brought
in an Article 78 proceedings are coming into federal court
more and more for exactly the reasons that I mentioned.
There is an enormous overlap of actions that can be brought
both as state court common law or statutory actions and as
federal statutory actions. By the way, just as an aside, there
are some that can only be brought as one rather than the
other; there are some actions which are not constitutional actions although they may be actions against state and local officers. The prime example, of course, is Paul v. Davis,"'8 in
114. Id.
115. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
116. Id.

117. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988); Venegas v. Mitchell, 110 S. Ct. 1679
(1990), Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 75 (1989), Texas State Teachers Ass'n v.
Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).

119. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). A flyer was distributed to approximately 800
merchants with a picture and name of the respondent in which respondent was identified as an "active shoplifter." After the charges were dismissed, respondent insti-
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which the Court held that defamation claims against governmental officials could never be brought as federal constitutional
claims. 120 There are some causes of action which are of such a
low level of deprivation that they do not rise to the constitutional level.121 Therefore, they may only be brought in state
court. On the other hand, there are some claims which are
purely federal constitutional actions; namely, those actions
which consist of true procedural due process issues, and therefore, do not have a common law or statutory analog. But those
are very fringe areas. I think that every one of the constitutional cases that the Supreme Court heard last' year, which
were brought under section 1983, have a state common law
statutory analog. 22
Well, which kinds of cases should be kept in state court?
The Supreme Court keeps grappling with that issue. Are there
any group of cases that can be brought in state court and that
should stay there? Well, the negligence cases are clearly one
category. After Daniels v. Williams, 23 and O'Connor v. Donaldson,1 24 such cases must be kept in state court. That is one
area the Supreme Court has agreed upon. The category of
cases where the underlying conduct is negligent rather than intentional should be kept out of federal court.1 25
There is a greater category of cases, however, where the
state will really give you a remedy; where they will put money
tuted an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the police chief, who actually dis-

tributed these flyers, alleging the petitioner's action under the color of law deprived
him of his constitutional rights. Id. at 693.
120. Id. at 710.
121. Baker v. MeCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1979).
122. See, e.g., Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990); Howlett
v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990).

123. 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Petitioner brought a section 1983 claim in federal
district court, alleging that the respondents' negligence deprived him of his "liberty"
interest in freedom from bodily injury "without due process of law." Id. Petitioner
sought to recover damages for injuries sustained when he slipped on a pillow negligently left on the stairs by respondent sheriff's deputy. At the time of the accident,
petitioner was an inmate in a Richmond, Virginia jail. Id.
124. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Donaldson brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

in which he alleged that O'Connor and other staff members of a Florida State
mental hospital intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his constitutional right
to liberty when they confined him against his will for nearly 15 years, Id. at 564-65.
125. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328.
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in the pocket of the victim; where they will give him whatever
the remedy in federal court would be. Is there some other way
to parse out, to carve out, some area of cases that really belong
in state court? That is how the Parratt v. Taylor1 2 6 doctrine
began-involving the twenty-three dollar hobby kit that was
lost while the prisoner was in isolation.12 Should we assume
that one of the ways of punishing people is not to give them a
hobby kit while they are in isolation? Of course, if they were
permitted to have their hobby kit with them while in isolation,
they might actually enjoy the experience. As a result, when the
hobby kit arrived, they did not give it to the prisoner. 128 When
he came out of isolation, he asked for it and found out that it
was lost.12 9 Who does he sue? He sues the warden and he sues
the hobby kit manager.113 Did you know there is a hobby kit
manager in every prison, or at least in prisons in Nebraska? At
any rate, he sues them for the lost hobby kit, for the value of
the lost hobby kit.' 3 '
The Supreme Court held - first, he only lost property; second, the loss was a result of a negligent act; third, it was really
a procedural due process violation. 32 If you focus on the constitutional right that was lost, the right was the deprivation of
his property, i.e., the loss of the hobby kit without a hearing
before the actual occurrence.13 3 That is an odd way to characterize the constitutional right, but that is how the Supreme
Court approached it. Fourth, the act was random and unauthorized, in the sense that there were no state procedures that really dealt with this issue. The state, which we now separate
from the individual who was responsible, could not anticipate
that this sort of situation would arise and more important, as
we see, they could not anticipate at what point this situation
would arise.13 4 In other words, he was in isolation for sixty
126. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
127. Id. at 529.

128. Id. at 530.
129. Id.

130. Id.
131. Id. at 543.

13Z. Id.
133. Id.
134. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981).
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days; the hobby kit came at some point during that sixty day
period; there was no single point at which the state was able to
tell the officer to give the prisoner a meaningful pre-deprivation
hearing before the actual disappearance of the hobby kit. 3 '
They could not anticipate that event happening. Fifth, there
was an adequate state remedy down the line. 136 There was a
Nebraska tort claims procedure under which the prisoner could
get his twenty-three dollars back.137 When you put all five of
these issues together, you are really talking about the lack of a
pre-deprivation hearing before the property and the procedural
due process right was lost.' 38 But there is a post-deprivation
hearing.' 39
The Court in Parrattplugged into another line of cases that
the Supreme Court had decided. 40 Even though the state may
do something wrong initially, a prompt or post-deprivation
hearing would be a sufficient remedy.' 4 ' Since this entire situation is viewed as a procedural due process problem, the Court
indicated that by giving the individual a post-deprivation hearing, the state gave you whatever the Constitution required. 42
In other words, you have not been deprived of property without
due process of the law. 43 You may have been deprived of
property, but the post-deprivation hearing was sufficient to
meet the due process of law requirement. Therefore, the Nebraska tort claims procedure14 4 would be a sufficient remedy
which would put twenty-three dollars back in your pocket.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
(Court

Id. at 543.
Id.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 543.
Id.
See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950)
upheld, under the fifth amendment due process clause, the summary seizure

and destruction of drugs without a pre-seizure hearing); Bowles v. Willingham, 321
U.S. 503 (1944) (Court upheld the authority of an administrative body to issue rent
control orders without providing a hearing to landlords before the regulation fixing
rents became effective).
141. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538 (1981).
142. Id. at 539.
143. Id. at 540 (quoting Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.

1975), modified, 54 F.2d 565 (1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978)).
144. See NEB. REv.

STAT.

§§ 81-88, 209 (1976).
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Everyone squinted at that decision. What happens in a case
in which a policeman assaults you without affording you a
hearing before that incident? The state could not anticipate
such an assault. Further, the state could never anticipate the
whole range of encounters between the police and a citizen.
Should the citizen be given a hearing before any one of these
encounters? If that is the way you look at the process, you
would always have a remedy later on, i.e., you could sue him
for assault and battery. Which part of that Supreme Court decision really counts? What are the real elements that count in
the Parrattv. Taylor situation? Those of us who thought that
section 1983 meant something believed that Parrattshould be
narrowly interpreted: you had to have negligent deprivation of
property, a procedural due process violation, and a random unauthorized act. If you try to keep Parrattto the twenty-three
dollar hobby kit case, then nothing else would fall into that
category. Of course, it took a little while for the Supreme
Court to deal with the true issues.
The next case that came along was Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co.,"15 in which it was held that the deprivation of property was by an established state procedure." 6 In this case, the
individual lost his capacity to challenge a hearing of an Illinois
board if the challenge was not presented to the state court
within a set period of time." 1 It was precisely that very established state procedure which did not give him the time to take
advantage of the statute." 8 In a unanimous decision, the Court
stated clearly that Parrattv. Taylor does not apply when there
is an established state procedure that created the deprivation. 14 9 That, indeed, was exactly what Justice Frankfurter
stated in his dissent.5 0 So even Frankfurter would not have
had any problem with that theory.
If the state requires something to happen that is constitutionally defective, surely you should be able to come into fed145. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
146. Id. at 431.

147. Id. at 426.
148. Id.

149. Id. at 435-36.
150. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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eral court to rectify that situation. Therefore, Logan did not
really add very much to that doctrine.
The next case was Hudson v. Palmer.'5 Hudson starts to
deal with some of the distinctions made in Parratt.Among the
factors to consider as to when the state procedure would supply
due process and therefore preclude a section 1983 case, were
whether intentional versus negligent conduct was involved;
property versus liberty; random and unauthorized conduct on
the one hand versus established state procedure on the other.
The Court started to deal with those kinds of issues in Hudson
v. Palmer,which compared intentional versus negligent acts on
the part of a prison official. 1 2 It is very much like the situation
in Parratt,but instead of losing his hobby kit because of the
prison official's negligence, in Hudson v. Palmer the inmate
lost his legal papers because of the intentional conduct of the
prison official. 53a Still the case involved a low level guard who
had no authority of any kind to deal with that property. Therefore, the other issue.of Parrattcame into play in that the deprivation was random and unauthorized. At no time in the continuum when the guard was dealing with the inmate could the
state anticipate that something would go wrong. Therefore, the
state could not assume or anticipate that it would have to come
4
in and do something to protect the prisoner's rights.1
In Hudson v. Palmer, the Supreme Court stated that the
alternate state remedy rationale of Parrattv. Taylor 55 applied
to both intentional and negligent conduct. At least one of the
five things I mentioned was settled; namely, that Parratt ap6
plies to intentional as well as negligent. conduct.G
But the other issues - property versus liberty, does Parratt
apply only to a procedural due process right, or does it also
apply to a substantive right, a right under the first, fourth or
151. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
152. Id. at 534. The respondent, an inmate at a Virginia penal institution, filed

an action in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that petitioner,
an officer at the institution, had intentionally destroyed some of respondent's personal property during an unreasonable search. Id. at 519-20.
153. Id. at 520.

154. Id. at 534.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 533.
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eighth amendment. What is the difference between substantive
due process and procedural due process? Well, in law school,
your very first day you are usually asked what the difference is
between procedure and substance. I still do not know. I know a
little more now than I knew then, but that same issue came up
in Lochner v. New York, 157 and resurrects itself in the Parratt
v. Taylor line of cases as well.
Does Pdrratt v. Taylor158 apply only to procedural due process violations? Does it apply to liberty versus property rights?
What is the difference between random and authorized on the
one hand and established state procedure on the other? What
is an adequate state remedy? The lower courts grappled for
about five years with those issues because the Supreme Court
did not deal with any of those issues until it decided Zinermon
v. Burch.1 59

Zinermon was a mental health case. Burch, the plaintiff, had
a few mental problems. He was picked up while wandering
along some highway late at night.16 0 He was brought in by
some local official, diagnosed on the spot as hallucinatory,
schizophrenic and psychotic. He was sent to the Florida State
Hospital and, to show you how bad he was, he thought he was
in heaven. 61 He confused the Florida State Hospital with
heaven! Under Florida law, there were only two ways to keep a
person involuntarily in the local hospital. First, you could hold
a hearing to invoke the emergency hearing provisions of Florida law.162 At that time, a lawyer would be appointed to represent the defendant at a hearing which would be held within
seven to ten days. 6 3 His mental condition would be examined
and certain pre-conditions would have to be found, namely that
the defendant was either a danger to himself or that he could
1 64
not fend for himself.
157. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

158. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
159. 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).

160. Id. at 979.
161. Id.

162. Id. at 981 (citing FLA. STAT. § 394.463(1)(a) (1981)).
163. Id. at 982.
164. Id.
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The second procedure dealt with a voluntary consent
form. 165 In Burch's case, the doctors who diagnosed the patient
as psychotic and schizophrenic presented him with a form to
sign under which he consented to be held in the facility. He
was then required to remain there for one hundred eighty
days. 6 A hearing was never held to determine whether he
should be committed. During that time, they involuntarily administered psychotropic drugs, and then finally after one-hun67
dred-eighty days, he was released.1
He then sued for deprivation of his liberty without due process of law. 16 8 Now, the district court dismissed the entire case
on Parrattgrounds. It went through the factors that we talked
about. 16 9 First, the court said Parrattapplies to liberty as well
as property.1 70 Second, the district court judge stated that this
action was random and unauthorized.' 7 ' The court agreed that
the doctors should have given this person a hearing. The case
then went to the Supreme Court after the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal. 72 By the way, I wrote the amicus brief. 17 3
The state not only admitted but proclaimed that the doctors'
actions were illegal under state law.1 4 Therefore, the state declared that since such an action was illegal under state law, the
individual should have been given a hearing under state law,
and he could now sue for false imprisonment. 175 But such an
act was characterized as random and unauthorized. 7 6 The
State of Florida could not anticipate that these doctors would
not give him the hearing. This procedure was therefore not re165. Id.
166. Id. at 980.

167. Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 980 (1990).
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 982.
Id. at 978.
Id.
Id.
Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990), affg, Burch v. Apalachee Com-

munity Mental Health Serv., Inc., 840 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1987).
173. Brief for Respondent, Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990) (No. 87-

1965) (Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU
of Florida in Support of Respondent on file at the offices of the Touro Law Review).
174. Id. at 977.
175. Id. at 978.
176. Id. at 977.
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quired by state law."' Under Logan,17 8 such a deprivation
could not be remedied in federal court unless it was caused by
an established state procedure. This state procedure was not an
established state procedure. It was the contrary. It was random
and unauthorized. 7 9 Therefore, Parratt1 0 applies, and as a result, this case does not belong in federal court. Plaintiff must
seek his remedy in state court. 18'
The Eleventh Circuit, in a split decision, focused on a different phase of the Parrattrationale."8 " The case finally arrives in
the Supreme Court. The Court must now return to those issues
that it had dismissed in Parrattand Hudson. They reexamined
all of the issues. Burch wins five to four. He has stated a good
cause of action, according to the majority. As Professor
Schwartz said, what is most significant is that the dog did not
bark in this case.1 3 The Supreme Court did not take the opportunity to really cut back on section 1983. They held in
Zinermon that number one, it does apply to liberty against
property. 84 Zinermon holds for the first time at the Supreme
Court level that the Parratt v. Taylor'85 rationale applies no
matter what the interest is.18 6 Number two, Parrattv. Taylor
does not apply to substantive violations, first or fourth amendment violations, or for that matter substantive due process violations."8 7 The Court does not define the difference between a
procedural or substantive violation. I was there at oral argument. There was a debate between Justices Stevens and Scalia
177. Id. at 978.
178. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).

179. Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 975 (1990).
180. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).

181. Id. at 541.
182. Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Serv., Inc., 840 F.2d 797

(Ilth Cir. 1988).
183. Schwartz, Section 1983, The Supreme Court and Local Government Law, 7

TouRo L. REv. 5, 8-9 (1991).
184. Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 986 (1990).
185. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).

186. Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 986. The Court determined that in special cases
such as Parratt,the tort remedy which the state provided was sufficient. The very
nature of the negligent loss of property made it impossible for the state to predict
such deprivations and, therefore, provide pre-deprivation process. Id. at 985.
187. Id. at 990.

312

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

on the difference between substantive due process violations
and procedural due process violations. It was a fascinating
debate.
The Supreme Court determined that the rationale in Parratt
v. Taylor, which was concerned with the availability of an alternate state remedy, is irrelevant if the plaintiff is alleging a
substantive or substantial due process violation. 188 The key issue in the case turns on the meaning of random and unauthorized. We know that Logan"' says if it is part of an established state procedure, Parrattdoes not apply. 1 0 The real issue
is whether there is a logical dividing line between random, unauthorized acts on the one hand, and established state procedure on the other, in which Parratt v. Taylor applies, and
there is. The key question is whether the person who is doing
the deprivation is in a position to give you a hearing. 1 The
Supreme Court stated that the really operative language was
that the petitioners could not claim that the deprivation of
Burch's liberty was unpredictable. 192 Under Florida's statutory
scheme, only a person competent to give informed consent may
be admitted as a voluntary patient. 193 There is no specified way
of determining before a patient is asked to sign admission
94
forms whether he is incompetent.
It is hardly unforeseeable that a person requesting treatment
for mental illness might be incapable of informed consent, and
that state officials with the power to admit patients might take
their apparent willingness to be admitted at face value, and not
initiate involuntary placement procedures.
Thus, any erroneous deprivation will occur at a specific pre98 and
dictable point in the process.1 95 In Hudson v. Palmer,"
Parrattv. Taylor, 9 7 it was not known when the guard would
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
Id. at 435.
Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 990 (1990).
Id. at 989.
Id.
Id.

195. Id. at 990.
196. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
197. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
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deprive the individual of property. The state, which in this instance is a separate entity from its officials, never knew when
the official could grab the prisoner's property. There is nothing
the state can do because officials deal with these people at so
many points in the process that the state can never know when
one of its officials is in a position to do something bad. 9 8 In the
admission process, there is a predictable point where the state
can ensure that proper procedures will be performed.Y99
It is the predictability that something can go wrong during
that particular process and the fact that the state can protect
against such a wrong, that makes the state responsible for
what happened. 0 0 It is not only that the state can predict that
something can go wrong, but also that the state can predict at
what point it can go wrong.2 ' Since the state has the ability to
come in and ensure that a hearing happens at that point, and if
they do not, it can truly be said that someone's constitutional
rights were violated. 02 It is not random and unauthorized. At
that point, Parrattv. Taylor cannot be applied. 3 Therefore,
you have a section 1983 case available.
I am trying to make some sense out of that. There have been
two cases that have applied Zinermon. I must read to you a
section from Judge Easterbrook's concurring opinion in Easter
House v. Felder.20 4 Judge Easterbrook tried to reconcile Parratt v. Taylor with Zinermon. Easterbrook stated, "Zinermon
v. Burch is inconsistent with the foundations of Parrattv. Taylor and Hudson v. Palmer.2 03 That is it.
Zinermon said that if errors in the implementation of a state's scheme
for civil commitment are foreseeable, then process after the fact is
inadequate, and it distinguished Parratt and Hudson on the ground
that the wrongs committed in those cases were not foreseeable. This is
no distinction at all. It is always foreseeable that there will be some
errors in the implementation of any administrative system, and it is
never foreseeable which occasions will give rise to these errors. It was
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 541.
Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 990 (1990).
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
910 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1408 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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foreseeable that some prison guards would lose the prisoner's property
(Parratt),just as it was foreseeable that some person would be committed without proper authorization (Zinermon); in neither case could
the state or a court know in advance just when the errors would occur.
If foreseeability of the category of blunders require process in advance, then Parrattand Hudson were wrongly decided; if the inability
to foresee the particularblunder makes subsequent remedies all the
process that is "due," then Zinermon was wrongly decided. The cases
cannot coexist .... 206

There must be more of a rationale in Parratt and Zinermon

than we realize.
Let me just illustrate one other case decided after Zinermon
that might throw a little light on the issue. It is a case called
Matthias v. Bingley.2 °7 City and local governments are going

to get more and more of these cases. In Matthias, the city had
a procedure for selling property seized in a criminal investigation. 20 8 No one made a claim on certain property and no procedures were established to find the owner. The question is what should they do with the property? Under their procedures, an officer is supposed to investigate and then authorize
the sale. A city officer is supposed to, once he is in possession
of the .property, and after the completion of the criminal investigation, make a few phone calls, see if there is someone who
raised some claim to it, and then authorize its sale. What happened in that case was that the local officer did not authorize
the sale according to normal city procedure. The property was
simply sold. The real owner appears later, requesting his property. 20 9 There was no notice. You cannot sell property without
notice.210 Now if you focus on Parrattv. Taylor,21' you would
conclude that it is the officer's fault, since he did not sign the
authorization form when he was supposed to. His failure to
sign the authorization form was a random, unauthorized act.
Therefore, you cannot come into federal court, you must go
into state court and sue for replevin or trover in order to get
your property back.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
906 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1048-49.
Id. at 1049-50.
Id.at 1058.
451 U.S. 527 (1981).
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Indeed, Judge Edith Jones, who was on the panel on that
case, concurred that an opposite result was required by
Zinermon.s21 You can no longer look at the problem that way.
You do not look at what the individual officer did or did not
do. You have to look at the bigger picture. One should look at
whether the city as a whole really followed or gave the proper
procedures. Could the city, as a whole, anticipate that in a particular case the authorization form would not be filled out?
There really was a predictable point in the process where you
could see the city procedure falling apart, in which proper procedure would not be followed. What Zinermon requires is for a
local government to look at the bigger picture and see whether
the entire procedure was proper from start to finish. There was
a predictable point where proper procedures would not be
made available. In Matthias, the Court held that after a careful review, this case falls under Logan rather than Parrattand
therefore a section 1983 case was available.213
The issue is whether the city or local government could anticipate that at some point in the process some sort of hearing
is required. The state must make sure that the people in a position to give that pre-deprivation process comply with that necessity. It is necessary and it is predictable that someone might
make a mistake and not give a hearing. Such an act is not
going to be considered random and unauthorized, because the
city could have come in and made sure that process is complied
with. That is exactly what happened in Zinermon.1 4
You could have anticipated a contrary decision from the Supreme Court, and indeed the four dissenters stated,21 . that
there is nothing between established state procedure on the one
hand, and everything else, which must be considered random
and unauthorized.2 16 That really could have been the result if
Justice White had gone that way. That result would have
taken us right back to Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Monroe
212. Matthias, 906 F.2d at 1058 (Jones, J., concurring).

213. Id. at 1056.
214. Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).

215. Id. at 990 (O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rchnquist,
C.J., Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined).
216. Id.
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v. Pape.21 You cannot come into federal court on section 1983
unless the constitutional deprevation is something that is the
direct product of state law. 218 But the Court did not do that.
What we now have are three categories, not just two. One category being an established state procedure; a second category
being anticipatable and predictable failures to give process by
a state or local officer at a predictable point in the process, in
which case Parrattdoes not apply; and third, true random and
unauthorized acts at the far end, which may be very limited
now. In the last category are cases where the person who actually did the deprivation is a state actor, but his actions could
not have been stopped by the state at any predictable point in
the process because he did not have any power to give any process at the' point where the action occurred.
Now, that is where we are. After Zinermon, all of these issues have to be refined. We still have section 1983 and now we
just have some new words to define in later cases.
Judge George Pratt:

I think Parrattis still up for grabs. As you can see, it is an
extremely complicated problem. Zinermon, of course, is one of
those cases, five-to-four, in which Justice Brennan is in the majority. Would somebody like to ask Judge Souter how he
stands on the Parrattv. Taylor issue, which really is a fundamental problem of substantive versus procedural due process.
This is what cost Robert Bork the Supreme Court judgeship,2 19
his outspoken position on it. Abortion is only one side issue of
that larger problem. Where Judge Souter comes down on that,
maybe we will know next year by this time, and maybe we will
not.
217. 365 U.S. 167, 202 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
218. Id.
219. Robert Bork takes the "position that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment should be denied any substantive content apart from its incorporation of the Bill of Rights." Book Note, .The Priest Who Kept His Faith but Lost
His Job, 103 HARV. L. REV. 2074, 2077 (1990); see R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
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Professor Gary Shaw:
I believe that the results in Zinermon are consistent with
much of what Professor Schwartz said about a trend, in this
last Term, towards a predominance of federal law over state
law. Whenever this trend occurs, it introduces a wild card. For
me, that wild card is the tenth amendment.220 In National
League of Cities v. Usery,221 the court held that the tenth
amendment should be an affirmative shield against improper
federal powers that were going towards core functions of the
State.222 Soon thereafter, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority223 reversed National League of Cities with
the Court returning to its original position, one vigorously opposed by Justice Rehnquist, that the tenth amendment is no
more than a truism.224 Given the fact that Justice Rehnquist is
interested in overruling Garcia,225 that Judge Souter will now
be coming onto the Court, and that there may be some backlash towards this increased predominance of federal power, my
question is if the tenth amendment were resurrected, for example, if Garcia were overruled and National League of Cities v.
Usery or something similar to it came back into effect, what
effect do you think this would have on section 1983?
Professor Leon Friedman:
I have an easy answer. The easy answer is if a state deprives
you of life, liberty, or property, that is not a function protected
by the tenth amendment. All section 1983 does is to ensure
220. US. CONsT. amend. X, provides that "[tihe powers not delegated to the
Unites States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
221. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by, Garcia v. San Antonio Mctro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
222. Id. at 851-52.
223. 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruling, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976).
224. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1940) (explaining that "[t]he
amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered").
225. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist implied that he would be inclined to overrule Garciz and return to the holding of National League of Cities,
when the principles set forth in that case once "again command the support of a
majority of th[e] Court." id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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that the states, as states, using those governmental powers, do
not violate the constitutional rights of their citizens. I just do
not see a tenth amendment wild card. I do not see the Garcia
and National League of Cities cases as a problem. I do think
that if Souter were on the Court last year, and Zinermon went
226
the other way, that you would go back to a Monroe v. Pape
situation. I think that is the danger. I do not think it is the
tenth amendment.
Professor Martin Schwartz:
I have a somewhat different perspective in terms of the predominance of the federal law over the state law. To some extent, the pro-plaintiff section 1983 interpretation that Judge
Pratt referred to227 and which I agreed with, has to be understood in a much broader context, and the broader context is
one which acknowledges a basic principle that section 1983 itself does not create any federal rights at all. Section 1983 is
only there for the enforcement of federal rights that the Supreme Court has recognized under the federal constitution or
under federal statutory law. This predominance then in federal
interest, which is reflective in this line of pro-plaintiff section
1983 decisions, only becomes meaningful to civil rights plaintiffs if the Court will continue to be vigilant in the recognition
of, for example, a constitutionally protected right of privacy,
and in giving individuals meaningful rights under the equal
protection and due process clauses, because without the recognition of those federally protected rights, there is in actuality
no meaning that is of significance to the pro-plaintiff section
1983 decisions.
The tenth amendment has not to this point, as Professor
Friedman states, and I think he is right, played any kind of
important role in section 1983 litigation. And in terms of what
the tenth amendment means, nobody has figured it out yet, and
I do not know that we are in any better a position to figure it
out.

226. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
227. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.

